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Abstract
Individuals learn both from the outcomes of their own internally generated actions (“experiential learning”) and from the
observation of the consequences of externally generated actions (“observational learning”). While neuroscience research has
focused principally on the neural mechanisms by which brain structures such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
support experiential learning, relatively less is known regarding how learning proceeds through passive observation. We
explored the necessity of the vmPFC for observational learning by testing a group of patients with damage to the vmPFC as well
as demographically matched normal comparison and brain-damaged comparison groups—and a single patient with bilateral
dorsal prefrontal damage—using several value-learning tasks that required learning from direct experience, observational
learning, or both. We found a speciﬁc impairment in observational learning in patients with vmPFC damage manifest in the
reduced inﬂuence of previously observed rewards on current choices, despite a relatively intact capacity for experiential
learning. The current study provides evidence that the vmPFC plays a critical role in observational learning, suggests that there
are dissociable neural circuits for experiential and observational learning, and offers an important new extension of how the
vmPFC contributes to learning and memory.
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Introduction
To make optimal decisions, individuals must learn the value of
stimuli in an ever-changing environment and use this information
to guide choice behavior.Whilemuch research has been conducted
regarding the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in
value-guided choices based on learning from the consequences
of one’s own actions (Damasio et al. 1990; Damasio 1994; Bechara
et al. 2000; Rolls 2004; Rangel et al. 2008; Kable and Glimcher 2009;
Rushworth et al. 2011; Rudebeck and Murray 2011a), less is under-
stood about the neural mechanisms by which individuals learn
the value of stimuli in the environment through the passive ob-
servation of externally generated actions and their consequences.
Interestingly, however, a recent neuroimaging investigation
(Burke et al. 2010) found that observational learning in a social
context was related to brain activation in speciﬁc portions of pre-
frontal cortex, speciﬁcally the vmPFC and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (dlPFC). Notably, activation of the 2 regions was related
to dissociable aspects of observational learning: vmPFC activa-
tion was linked speciﬁcally to prediction errors at the time of
“outcome” (i.e., outcome prediction error: Differences between
expected and observed reward), whereas activity in dlPFC re-
ﬂected prediction errors at the time of “choice” (i.e., action predic-
tion error: Differences between expected and observed action).
In the current study, we tested the hypothesis that the vmPFC
is necessary for an intact capacity for observational learning, by
examining the performance of patients with focal lesions of the
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vmPFC.While the notion of observational learning is multifaceted
(Hopper 2010; Zentall 2012), here we focus on a speciﬁc compo-
nent of this process: The ability of individuals to learn from
passively watching the consequences of actions that were exter-
nally generated (i.e., by a computer player whose choices were
random, and known to be so by participants). Our experimental
paradigm, therefore, differs from previous studies in the ﬁeld of
social decision-making that have examined how individuals
learn from and imitate the behavior of intelligent social agents
(Sanfey 2007; Hampton et al. 2008; Behrens et al. 2009; Burke
et al. 2010; Seo and Lee 2012; Boorman et al. 2013; Chang et al.
2013). Instead, our procedure has closer parallels with experimen-
tal paradigms used to investigate the differential contributions of
the striatum and hippocampus to feedback-based and observa-
tional learning, respectively, in the memory literature (Poldrack
et al. 2001; Shohamy et al. 2004)—and also the “ghost” conditions
usedpreviously to examine thenonsocial components of observa-
tional learning—for example, where the observer passively
watches a remotely controlled door being moved randomly either
to the right or to the left byanexperimenter to reveal a food reward
(Hopper et al. 2008; Hopper 2010).
We assessed the performance of a cohort of patients who had
focal damage to the vmPFC (vmPFC group), as well as healthy nor-
mal comparison (NC), brain-damaged comparison (BDC) groups,
and a single casewithdamage to the bilateral dorsal prefrontal cor-
tex (dPFC; Fig. 1 and see Supplementary Figs 1–3 and Tables 1–4)
Figure 1. Lesion overlapmaps for the vmPFC group. Top: voxel-wise overlapmaps of lesion overlapmapped into a template space. “Hotter” colors indicate a greater overlap
of lesions across participants (distinct color scales are used in the top andbottompanels). From left: a three-dimensional reconstruction of the lesion overlaps viewed from
the bottom and right medial perspectives, with black vertical lines indicating the coronal slice locations: caudal coronal slice; middle coronal slice; and rostral coronal
slice. On the far left, an “axial” slice (see Supplementary Fig. 1 for further axial slices). Bottom: a schematic region-of-interest (ROI)-based lesion overlap map
illustrating gray matter lesion overlap counts in ROIs for all patients whose lesion encompassed at least 10% of ROI gray matter. See Supplementary Figure 1 for BDC
lesion overlap map, and Supplementary Tables 1–4 for patient demographics and anatomical information.
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in a series of relatively simple two-arm bandit tasks (Fig. 2) in-
volving either “experiential learning” alone (phases 1 and 2), “ob-
servational learning” alone (phase 4), or both types of learning
interleaved (phase 3). Although previous neuropsychological
studies have assessed whether vmPFC patients perform deci-
sion-making tasks differently from comparison participants by
using coarse aggregate measures of behavior (Rolls et al. 1994;
Fellows and Farah 2003; Hornak et al. 2004; Fellows and Farah
2007; Tsuchida et al. 2010), here we applied ﬁne-grained analytic
procedures to characterize choice behavior (Lau and Glimcher
2005; Kennerley et al. 2006; Rutledge et al. 2009; Kovach et al.
2012). Critically, this analysis allowed us to distinguish the un-
ique inﬂuences of past actions and outcomes (both “experienced”
and “observed”) on subsequent behavior. Based on recent neuro-
imaging ﬁndings relating to observational learning in the social
domain (Burke et al. 2010), we predicted that patients with
vmPFC lesions would show an impairment in observational
learning in the context of our experimental paradigm, reﬂected
in the reduced inﬂuence of observed outcomes on participants’
behavior. Indeed, our study was speciﬁcally conﬁgured to test
the prediction that the vmPFC makes a critical contribution
to learning from observed outcomes, because outcomes were
informative whereas observed choices were not (i.e., the choices
of the computer player were random).
Materials and Methods
Participants: Neuropsychology
The target patient group for this study (N = 11) consisted of adults
with damage to the vmPFC who have generally intact psycho-
metric intelligence,memory, and executive function (see Supple-
mentary Table 1). A group of neurologically and psychiatrically
normal adults (N = 11) were enrolled as healthy comparison
(NC) participants, and a group of psychiatrically normal adults
with focal brain damage (N = 11) served as BDC participants. All
3 groups were well matched for average age (mean [SD] years of
age: NC = 64.25 [6.47]; BDC = 60.36 [12.39]; and vmPFC = 64.09
[7.99]) and education (years of education: NC = 15.33 [2.50]; BDC =
16.45 [2.34]; and vmPFC = 14.73 [2.19]), and equal numbers ofmen
andwomenwere enrolled in each group (6 female and 5male; see
Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). We also tested 1 patient with
damage to the dPFC (see Supplementary Table 2 and Fig. 3) that
included bilateral dorsolateral and dorsomedial PFC. A single
Figure 2. Overview of experimental phases in the probabilistic task. (A) During “ACTIVE” trials (blue border, for illustration), participants chose a fractal and then either
received feedback concerning the outcome of their choice (phases 1–3), or received no feedback (phase 4). During “WATCH” trials (yellow border, for illustration),
participants observed a computer player making a choice, followed by the outcome of this choice. Participants could learn by observing the outcomes during WATCH
trials—though the actual choices of the computer were known to be uninformative (i.e., random). The composition of individual phases differed as to whether
WATCH trials were included (phases 3–4), and whether the participant received feedback as to the outcomes of their own choices during ACTIVE trials (this was
present in phases 1–3; no experiential outcome feedback was presented in phase 4 although participants could still observe computer outcomes during WATCH
trials). Reversals occurred in phases 2–4, but not in phase 1. Different pairs of fractals were used in each phase. See Materials and Methods. (B) Schematic illustration
of trial type included (ACTIVE/WATCH) and feedback (yes or no) in each of the 4 experimental phases. (C) A typical reward schedule for one phase and one vmPFC
patient, illustrating how the reward values of the 2 fractals (blue and green lines) ﬂuctuated over trials. Note that 4 reversals were triggered in this example, through
the participant choosing the good stimulus in the last 9 of 10 preceding choices.
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case was studied because of the rarity of bilateral lesions of this
region, in contrast to unilateral lesions. The single dPFC patient
closely matched the other groups demographically and neurop-
sychologically, except for a speciﬁc impairment in executive
function (i.e., Wisconsin card sorting task; see Supplementary
Table 2).
Patients (vmPFC, BDC, and dPFC) were selected from the Pa-
tient Registry of the Division of Cognitive Neuroscience at the
University of Iowa. All patients conformed to the inclusion cri-
teria of the Patient Registry. Speciﬁcally, they had focal, stable le-
sions that could be clearly identiﬁed onmagnetic resonance (MR)
or computerized tomography (CT) scans, and they were free of
dementia, psychiatric disorder, and substance abuse. All partici-
pants were free of signiﬁcant intellectual impairments. The pa-
tients had no premorbid histories of abnormal social conduct,
emotional maladjustment, or other psychological disturbance.
Neuropsychological, neuroanatomical, and experimental studies
were all conducted in the chronic phase of recovery, >3 months
after lesion onset. All lesions were acquired in adulthood, and
were stable since the patient’smost recent neuroimaging session
and corresponding lesion analysis (see below). The neuropsycho-
logical tests reported in Supplementary Tables 1 and 2 were ad-
ministered after participating patients had enrolled in the
Patient Registry, but prior to their participation in this project.
At recruitment, the neuropsychological proﬁles of all patients
were stable since their most recent examinations, as supported
by informal observation during enrollment and test sessions.
NC participants were recruited from the surrounding community
through advertisement, and they were compensated for their
participation. The study was approved by the Human Subjects
Committee of the University of Iowa, and all participants gave in-
formed consent before completing the study in compliance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. Data were collected at the University
of IowaHospitals and Clinics, andwere de-identiﬁed before being
transmitted to other authors for collaborative consideration and
analysis.
Participants: Lesion Description and Analysis
vmPFC Group
Neuroanatomical analysis was based on MR data for 5 vmPFC
participants and CT data for 5 vmPFC participants (i.e., those
with surgically implanted clips). All structural neuroimaging
data were obtained in the chronic epoch. Each patient’s lesion
was reconstructed in 3 dimensions using Brainvox software
(Damasio and Frank 1992; Frank et al. 1997) and the MAP-3 tech-
nique (Damasio et al. 2004). Lesioned tissue evident on each
patient’s MR or CT scan was manually warped to corresponding
anatomy of a normal template brain. The template brain was
thenused as a common frame of reference to determine the over-
lap of lesion location among patients. Additionally, the template
brain was parcellated according to gyral boundaries (cf. Desikan
et al. 2006), which permitted volumetric analysis of the lesions
within parcels (Fig. 1 and see Supplementary Fig. 2). One vmPFC
participant (ID 10 in Supplementary Table 1) was excluded from
volumetric analysis. Although CT data revealed an orbitofrontal/
ventromedial lesion in this participant, there was insufﬁcient
anatomical detail for application of the MAP3 lesion mapping
method. Notably, all analyses of behavioral data were conducted
with and without this participant, and the same patterns of
vmPFC performance were uniformly observed.
Patients in the vmPFC groupwere selected on the basis of hav-
ing damage that included vmPFC in one or both hemispheres,
where vmPFC was deﬁned in the space of the template brain
and included gyrus rectus, ventromedial superior frontal gyrus
(vmSFG), and the medial orbitofrontal gyrus (mOrbG). Lesions
were caused by meningioma resection (5), arteriovenous malfor-
mation resection (1), subarachnoid hemorrhage (3), and stroke
(2). All patients with etiologies of stroke or subarachnoid hemor-
rhage had involvement of the anterior communicating or anter-
ior cerebral artery and had surgically implanted clips, as did one
resection patient.
Volumetrically (see Supplementary Tables 3 and 4), 9 of the 10
patients included in the analysis had lesions that included gray
matter within the gyrus rectus bilaterally, and one patient’s le-
sion did not include gray matter of the gyrus rectus (ID 5, refer
to Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). Among patients with gyrus
rectus damage, the proportion of parcel voxels included in the le-
sion was similar in the left (mean = 0.550; SD = 0.228) and right
(mean = 0.585; SD = 0.288) hemispheres. Meanwhile, 9 of the 10
patients had bilateral lesions that included gray matter in
mOrbG, whereas one patient’s lesion included only left mOrbG
graymatter (5). Among patientswithmOrbGdamage, the propor-
tion of parcel voxels included in the lesionwas somewhat greater
on the right (mean = 0.357; SD = 0.281) than on the left (mean =
0.248; SD = 0.181), but the difference was not statistically reliable
[T(17) = 1.015, P = 0.324]. Medially andmore superior, 8 of the 10 pa-
tients had lesions that bilaterally included gray matter in the
vmSFG, while one patient had vmSFG damage limited to the
right hemisphere (ID 4), and one had vmSFG damage limited to
the left hemisphere (ID 5). Among patients with vmSFG damage,
the proportion of parcel voxels included in the lesion was some-
what greater on the right (mean = 0.641, SD = 0.279) than on the
left (mean = 0.519, SD = 0.284), but the difference was not reliable
[T(16) = 0.918, P = 0.372]. Finally, a region just outside of what is
typically considered human vmPFC is presented for comparison.
Only 4 of the 10 patients included in the analysis had lesions that
bilaterally included gray matter in the lateral orbitofrontal gyrus
(lOrbG), whereas an additional 3 patients had damage to limited
to the right lOrbG, and 1 patient had damage limited to the left
lOrbG. Among patients with any nonzero lOrbG damage, the pro-
portion of parcel voxels included in the lesion was somewhat
greater on the right (mean = 0.216, SD = 0.196) than on the left
(mean = 0.075, SD = 0.046), but the difference was not reliable
[T(10) = 1.55, P = 0.151].
BDC Group
Participants in the BDC group underwent scanning and analysis
procedures identical to those described for the vmPFC group, and
neuroimaging datawere available for all BDC participants (10 MR
and 1 CT). None had damage to any portion of the vmPFC per our
deﬁnition (see above). Lesions were caused by meningioma
resection (N = 1), temporal lobectomy (N = 2: 1 left and 1 right),
arteriovenous malformation resection (N = 1), and stroke (N = 5).
Additionally, two BDC participants had combined etiologies:
BDC 8 underwent a right temporal lobectomy and suffered a con-
temporaneous right anterior choroidal artery stroke; and BDC 11
suffered a combined subarachnoid hemorrhage and infarct. For
all BDCs, damagewas principally limited to the temporal, occipi-
tal, or parietal lobes (see Supplementary Fig. 1).
Unique Dorsal Prefrontal Patient
The dPFC participant underwent a bilateral frontal meningioma
excision. The extent of the participant’s brain injury was as-
sessed using MR data. Signiﬁcant involvement of gray and
white matter in the dorsal medial and lateral prefrontal cortex
was evident (see Supplementary Fig. 3), but the vmPFC was
preserved.
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Experimental Tasks
Participants were paid $25 for the 2-h test session. Participants
were instructed that they would be playing a game in which
they would make choices, with their goal being to win as
many points as possible. The following versions of the task
were used, with the same task order used in all participants
tested. No response deadline was used, with participants en-
couraged to respond as soon as they felt conﬁdent of their
choice.
Probabilistic Task
Participants completed 4 phases of the probabilistic version of
the task including phases with only observational learning,
only experiential learning, or amixture of both (Fig. 2). The struc-
ture of phase 2 (experiential learning only) was based on the task
used previously in Hornak et al. (2004) and O’Doherty et al. (2001).
In each experimental phase, different fractal pairswere used. The
value of the good stimuluswas probabilistically drawn from1 of 2
uniform distributions: 70% (+80 to +250) or 30% (−10 to −60). The
value of the bad stimulus was likewise probabilistically drawn
from 1 of 2 different uniform distributions: 60% (−250 to −600)
or 40% (+30 to +65). The values of the 2 fractals were generated
randomly for each phase and participant: Different pairs of
fractals were used in each phase, and on each trial the position
(i.e., left or right) of a fractal was randomly generated. In all
phases, cumulative totals of participants’ overall winnings were
presented after every 5 trials. However, trial-by-trial feedback
concerning the outcome of participants’ choices was only pre-
sented in phases 1, 2, and 3 (see below).
Phase 1 (experiential learning). Participants completed “ACTIVE”
trials where they received trial-by-trial outcomes related to
their choices, with participants performing the task until a criter-
ion of 14 of 16 choices of the good stimulus was reached. Good
and bad item value distributions for this phase were different
from those used in phases 2–4, as per Hornak et al. (2004). The
value of the good stimulus was probabilistically drawn from 1
of 2 uniform distributions: 70% (+60 to +200) or 30% (+10 to +50).
The value of the bad stimulus was likewise probabilistically
drawn from 1 of 2 different uniform distributions: 60% (−70 to
−300) or 40% (+10 to +100).
Phase 2 (experiential learning). Participants completed ACTIVE
trials and received trial-by-trial outcomes related to their
choices, with a reversal occurring after a criterion of 9 of 10
choices of the good stimulus. The phase was terminated after
70 trials in total.
Phase 3 (experiential and observational learning). Participants per-
formed the task as in phase 2, and received trial-by-trial feedback
on ACTIVE trials as to the outcomes of their choices. However, on
alternate “WATCH” trials, participants did not make choices
themselves, but instead were given the opportunity to observe
the choices and outcomes generated by a computer player.
While participants were aware that the computer’s actual
choices were randomly determined and that they would not re-
ceive any rewards for the computer’s choices, they were in-
structed that the computer was effectively choosing in the
same environment (i.e., with the same underlying reward sche-
dules), and therefore they could learn about the values of the
fractals through observation. Participants were also told that
they would not win or lose points during WATCH trials, and run-
ning totals of accumulated points (presented after every ﬁfth
choice by the participant) did not reﬂect or report computer
wins or losses. This phase totaled 70 ACTIVE and 70 WATCH
trials. Reversals occurred as described for phase 2.
Phase 4 (observational learning only, reversal component, outcomes dis-
played only for computer choices, and not for participant choices). This
phase was identical in format to phase 3 (i.e., alternating ACTIVE
and WATCH trials), with the notable exception that participants
did not receive feedback concerning the reward outcomes of
their own choices during ACTIVE trials. Thus, participants
could only learn the stimulus values through observation, by
watching the computer’s choices and outcomes. Cumulative
point totals were provided after every ﬁfth participant choice. Re-
versals occurred as described for phase 2.
Deterministic Task (Experiential Learning)
This paradigm generally followed the procedure used by Fellows
and Farah (2003) and was used as a control task to measure ex-
periential learning performance in a very simple context. In our
implementation, participants were required to choose between
2 fractals, which we refer to as A and B, presented on the left
and right sides, respectively, of the display; position was rando-
mized. On any given trial, one fractal consistently (i.e., with
100% contingency) yielded a gain of 50 points (“good” stimulus),
with the other fractal yielding a loss of 50 points (“bad” stimulus).
Trial-by-trial feedback was provided to the participants, in add-
ition to a display of their cumulative point total after every 5
trials. Reversals occurred as described for phase 2 of the probabil-
istic task. Each participant completed 70 trials in total.
Analytic Procedures
In the probabilistic task, the reward values of the 2 fractals were
randomly generated for each phase and participants according
to the prespeciﬁed schedule described above. This was done to
avoid the possibility that observed deﬁcits could arise due to
the speciﬁc properties of any particular reward schedule (i.e., a
possible concern with the use of a single reward schedule across
all participants). To control for possible differences in average re-
ward values of stimuli between participant groups, we computed
the total number of pointswon in any phase above that predicted
by random choice (which would be equivalent to the average
value of both stimuli over trials). This measure (“points won”)
is used throughout and entered into the statistical analyses
performed. Basic statistical analyses were performed in SPSS
19 and R software. Statistical comparison of the single dPFC pa-
tient with the performance of the other experimental groups
(control, vmPFC, and BDC) was performed using the modiﬁed
Crawford’s t-test which was designed for this purpose (Crawford
and Garthwaite 2002).
Logistic Regression
We performed an analysis to examine the inﬂuence of previous
outcomes (i.e., points won) and choices on current behavior. To
achieve this, we carried out a logistic regression analysis follow-
ing the procedure previously used to evaluate the performance of
monkeys (Lau and Glimcher 2005; Kennerley et al. 2006) and hu-
mans (Rutledge et al. 2009; Kovach et al. 2012). This procedure has
the advantage of allowing choice parameters to be included in
the model in order to capture the effect of the past history of
choices, a feature which is particularly relevant in the current
context given previous reports that patients with vmPFC damage
may exhibit reversal deﬁcits due to an increased tendency to
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perseverate (McEnaney and Butter 1969; Rolls et al. 1994; Fellows
and Farah 2003).
This analysis seeks to estimate weights (i.e., coefﬁcients),
which deﬁne the contribution of past rewards and choices to cur-
rent choice, indexed by the choice log odds.
log
PA; t
PB; t
¼
X5
j¼1 α j ðRA; tj  RB; tjÞ þ
X5
j¼1 β j ðCA; tj  CB; tjÞ þ γ
where A = fractal A, B = fractal B; log PA; t=PB; t is the choice log
odds; t is the current trial; α j is a reward coefﬁcient relating to j
trials in the past; β j is a choice coefﬁcient relating to j trials in
the past; RA; tj is the magnitude of reinforcement (i.e., points
won) received for choosing fractal A at j trials in the past; CA;tj
is 1 if fractal A was chosen at j trials in the past (and zero other-
wise). γ is an intercept term that captures any residual bias not
explained by past rewards and choices. We included both subject
choices and rewards received, and those of a computer player
(where relevant, i.e., phases 3 and 4), in the regression model,
with the aim of capturing the inﬂuence of both directly experi-
enced, and observed, actions and outcomes on current behavior.
Given that subjects did not receive feedback relating to their
choices in phase 4, the magnitude of subject rewards for phase
4 was not included (i.e., coded as zero). Subject choices were en-
tered into the regression analysis in all phases.
Positive weights, therefore, index an increase in the log odds
(i.e., a tendency to favor fractal A), as a function of past rewards
ðα j Þ or choices ðβ j Þ. Given that in our study subjects had to
choose between 2 options in our task, we assume symmetrical
weights for both options [as in Lau and Glimcher (2005)]: that is,
a reward obtained j trials ago increases the log odds by α j if it was
received through choosing fractal A, but decreases the log odds
by α j if it was received by choosing fractal B.
For example, an α2 of 0.002 indicates that a positive reward of
200 points received by choosing fractal A 2 trials in the pastwould
increase the choice log odds by 0.4 (or the odds by e0:4 ¼ 1:49).
log
PA; t
PB; t
RA; tjCA; tje0:4 ¼ 1:49:
Model Comparison
Following Lau and Glimcher (2005), we carried out a search of the
parameter space, consideringmodels that included differing trial
length histories relating to human and computer player choices
and reward outcomes. To restrict the overall number of para-
meters given the size of our experimental dataset and ensure
the robustness of ﬁt, we constrained our search to 6 ACTIVE trials
in the past. Given thatWATCH trials alternatedwithACTIVE trials
in phases that incorporated observational learning (i.e., phases 3
and 4), we considered models that included terms for up to 3
WATCH trials in the past (i.e., since if the participant was current-
ly on aWATCH trial, the t−1WATCH trial actually occurred 2 trials
ago due to the intervening ACTIVE trial).
As in previous work (e.g., Lau and Glimcher 2005; Daw et al.
2006; Daw 2011), models were ﬁt using a process of maximum
likelihood estimation. We computed the ﬁt of the regression
model using a pseudo-R2 statistic:
Pseudo - R2 ¼ ðLLR  LLMÞ
LLR
:
where LLR indexes the maximum log likelihood of the model
under random choice, and LLM indexes the log likelihood of
the estimated model given the data. Regression models with
different trial histories (e.g., 5 trials in the past vs. 3 trials) were
compared using a standardmeasure, that is, the Akaike informa-
tion criterion (AIC).
AIC ¼ 2 logLLM þ 2k;
where LLM is the maximum log likelihood of the estimated
model, and k is the number of parameters. Models with lower
AIC values are preferred, where a difference of >10 indicates
strong support for the better ﬁtting model.
The main regression model reported (see Results) included
terms representing: (1) rewards received by the participant after
each of the previous 5 trials; (2) choices made by the participant
during each of the previous 5 trials; (3) rewards received by the
computer player (in phases 3 and 4) after each of the previous 3
computer trials; and (4) choices made by the computer player
(in phases 3 and 4) on each of the previous 3 computer trials.
The model speciﬁed above, consisting of 16 parameters and a
constant term, provided the best observed ﬁt to the overall data-
set, indexed by the pseudo-R2 measure (0.26); and an AIC of 2391,
which takes into accountmodel complexity. In comparison, sim-
pler models (e.g., modeling the effect of only 1 past trial for both
human and computer rewards and choices) provided a substan-
tially worse ﬁt to the data: AIC = 2461.
Parameter Evaluation
To avoid assumptions of normality and symmetry in our param-
eter estimates, we evaluated differences between parameter esti-
mates using nonparametric conﬁdence intervals and P-values
calculated with the BCa method (DiCiccio and Effron 1996). A total
of 1000 bootstrap samples were drawn from our observed data
using the methodology of Hsu et al. (2005), which stipulates ran-
domly drawing participants (N = 11 in our case) from the original
sample with replacement, and forming a single bootstrap sample
composedof all observations associatedwith the resulting sample
of participants (Hsu et al. 2005). Parameter values for the best-ﬁt
logistic model were recorded for each bootstrap sample. 95% BCa
conﬁdence intervals were calculated from these sets of boot-
strapped parameters, and the P-value reﬂecting the probability
that the interval contained 0 (PBCa ) wasused to evaluate parameter
signiﬁcance. We used this procedure within the comparison and
vmPFC groups, and additionally in a combined model including
interaction terms for group membership with each parameter.
Results
Participants completed 4 phases of a probabilistic two-arm ban-
dit task, which differed in terms of whether reversal occurred
(phases 2, 3, and 4), and in terms of trial composition (see Fig. 2
andMaterials andMethods). As is often the case in neuropsycho-
logical studies, patients were reimbursed with a ﬁxed monetary
account at the end of the experiment (i.e., rather than points
won translating into real monetary gain). During “ACTIVE” trials
(phases 1–4), participants selected an option, and in all phases
except phase 4, they received trial-by-trial feedback concerning
the outcome of their choice. During “WATCH” trials (phases 3
and 4), participants did notmake choices themselves but instead
were given the opportunity to observe the consequences (i.e., re-
ward outcomes) of externally generated actions (i.e., of the com-
puter player). Different experimental phases, therefore, involved
either only experiential learning (phases 1, 2), only observational
learning (phase 4), or a mixture of both (phase 3).
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Overall Performance on Probabilistic Task
We ﬁrst considered participants’ performance across the 4 ex-
perimental phases in terms of overall aggregate measures, such
as the total number of points won and tendency to switch after a
high magnitude loss. The pattern of performance was generally
similar for all groups, who earned approximately the same num-
ber of points per condition. The only exception was in the obser-
vational-only condition (phase 4), in which vmPFC patients
earned fewer points than comparisons prior to their ﬁrst reversal.
To anticipate, thismodest deﬁcitmay reﬂect themore signiﬁcant
deﬁcit that we observed in our subsequent regression analysis
(see the next section).
In phase 1 (experiential learning only: Materials and Methods
and Fig. 2), the vmPFC group required 45 trials on average to reach
acriterion (SEM = 11.3; see Supplementary Table 5), deﬁned as the
choice of the higher valued stimulus on 14 of the 16 preceding
trials, whereas NCs averaged 33 trials to reach a criterion (SEM =
6.2) and BDCs averaged 31 trials to reach a criterion (SEM = 5.2). No
signiﬁcant group-level differenceswere found for thismeasure or
for points won (each P > 0.2; Fig. 3). A repeated-measures ANOVA
conﬁrmed that the choice behavior of all groups showedwas sen-
sitive to largemagnitude trial outcomes, indexed bya signiﬁcant-
ly greater tendency to switch to the alternative stimulus
following a large magnitude loss (i.e., >200 points) when com-
pared with a large magnitude win (i.e., >100 points): main effect
of the outcome valence—F1,27 = 20.457, P < 0.0005; no signiﬁcant
group × valence interaction, F2,27 = 0.324, P > 0.7. No signiﬁcant
difference was found in overall switching tendency between
groups (F2,27 = 1.387, P > 0.25).
We next examined the overall performance of participants in
experimental phase 2 (experiential learning only) and 3 (experi-
ential and observational learning; Fig. 3 and see Supplementary
Table 5). No signiﬁcant differences were observed between the
participant groups along any measure of aggregate performance
(P > 0.1). All participant groups, therefore, were able to modify
their behavior in response to big wins and big losses (both as
deﬁned earlier): main effect of valence, each F1,30 > 50, each
P < 0.0001; no signiﬁcant interactions, each P > 0.5. Furthermore,
there were no signiﬁcant differences between participant groups
in cumulative gain (i.e., pointswon) over the course of the experi-
ment (each F2,30 < 0.4, each P > 0.7) or the number of reversals
achieved (each F2,30 < 0.9, each P > 0.4). Interestingly, therefore,
the performance of our cohort of vmPFC patients based on direct-
ly experienced actions and outcomes (i.e., phase 2) was indistin-
guishable from that of both NC and BDC participants. Given prior
work suggesting that lesions of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC)—or combined lesions of the lateral and medial OFC (Rude-
beck and Murray 2011b)—rather than the vmPFC, produce
marked reversal learning deﬁcits (Rushworth et al. 2011), we
asked whether damage to this brain region predicted perform-
ance. No signiﬁcant correlations were found between perform-
ance in any phase (i.e., either in terms of points won or number
of reversals) of individual vmPFC patients and the extent of dam-
age to the lateral orbital gyrus (each P > 0.1), as measured using
volumetric analyses (see Supplementary Table 4 and Materials
and Methods). Note, however, that this analysis can be consid-
ered exploratory and underpowered given the relatively limited
extent of damage to those regions inmost patients (<10% overall,
many with no damage or no damage: see Fig. 1 and Supplemen-
tary Fig. 1 and Table 4).
We next considered the overall performance of the vmPFC pa-
tient cohort in phase 4 (observational learning only), where
learning was dependent solely on the observation of reward out-
comes associated with the actions of a computer player during
WATCH trials (i.e., participant choices during ACTIVE trials
were not followed by feedback, although the unseen reward
was counted toward their cumulative total points won as in
other phases), which was known to be playing in the same envir-
onment but whose choices were random. Interestingly, all par-
ticipant groups demonstrated a substantial capacity to learn
about the values of stimuli, and to update these estimates in
the face of change (i.e., reversals), through observation. All parti-
cipants gained signiﬁcantly more points than predicted by
chance (each t(10) > 2.5, each P < 0.05): vmPFC (mean points won:
3486 [1350]); NC (mean points won: 4127 [891]); BDC (mean points
won: 4528 [770]; see Fig. 3 and Supplementary Table 5). While all
groups performed similarly in this phase according to several
measures including the number of reversals, points won after
the ﬁrst reversal, and switching behavior (all P > 0.1), both com-
parison groups outperformed vmPFC participants in the number
of points won prior to the ﬁrst reversal, F2,25 = 6.9, P = 0.004
(vmPFCmean = 510 [339], NCmean = 1529 [267], and BDCmean =
1908 [219]). Planned comparisons between vmPFC andNC groups
(t(16) = 2.361, P = 0.031) and vmPFC and BDC groups (t(17) = 3.5, P =
0.003) indicated that these differences were signiﬁcant; mean-
while, the comparison groups did not differ (t(17) = 1.1, P > 0.2).
While vmPFC participants also required numerically more trials
to trigger the ﬁrst reversal in phase 4 (vmPFC mean = 24.8 [5.3],
NC mean = 16.3 [4.0], and BDC mean = 19.1 [2.1]), this difference
did not approach signiﬁcance (F2,25 = 1.2, P > 0.3).
Logistic Regression Analyses: Experiential Learning
The relatively intact performance of vmPFC patients indicates that
generally normal experiential learning is possible in the face of
vmPFC damage. Critically, however, measures which summarize
performance across an entire phase (e.g., total points won) may
be insensitive to subtle abnormalities in underlying value repre-
sentations. Therefore, we applied a ﬁner-grained method of ana-
lysis to characterize the choice data using a logistic regression
Figure 3. Overall performance across the 4 phases of the probabilistic task. The
measure of total points is calculated as the cumulative gain above that of a
random player (i.e., earning the average value of the 2 fractals on each trials—
see Materials and Methods). Performance of vmPFC patients (black), BDC
patients (gray), and comparison participants (white). Note that phase 1 was
shorter in terms of the number of trials. Circles indicate the performance (i.e.,
number of points won) by individual participants. See Supplementary Table 5
for full details of performance indices.
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model (cf. Lau andGlimcher 2005; Rutledge et al. 2009; Kovachet al.
2012; see Materials and Methods). Importantly, our study gener-
ated a large quantity of choice data consisting of several thousand
trials per group, making it well suited to this type of analysis.
Logistic regression analyses afford the opportunity to examine
the inﬂuenceof past rewardsandactionsoncurrent behavior,with-
out assuming that these inﬂuences decay exponentially over time
(i.e., as in reinforcement learning models; Lau and Glimcher 2005;
Rutledge et al. 2009). This procedure seeks to estimate weights
(i.e., coefﬁcients), which deﬁne the contribution of past rewards
and choices to current choice, up to j trials in the past (seeMaterials
andMethods).While the rewardweights (α j ) index the inﬂuence of
a reward at trial t−j in the past on current choice at trial t, the choice
weights ðβ j Þ index the tendency of a given participant to persever-
ate (i.e., repeat the same choice) independent of any association of
choice with reward. Separate coefﬁcients were estimated for both
directly experienced choices and outcomes (i.e., relating to the par-
ticipants themselves during ACTIVE trials) and observed choices
and outcomes (i.e., of the computer player during WATCH trials,
see Materials and Methods). Positive weights, therefore, index an
increase in the choice log odds (e.g., tendency to favor fractal A),
as a function of past rewards (α j ) or choices ðβ j Þ .
Data from all experimental phases of the probabilistic task
were entered into the regression model to increase the size of
the dataset and reliability of the parameter estimates (Lau and
Glimcher 2005). The best-ﬁtting regression model (see Materials
and Methods for details of ﬁtting procedure) included terms re-
presenting: (1) Rewards received by the participant during each
of the previous 5 ACTIVE trials (in phases 1, 2, and 3); (2) choices
made by the participant during each of the previous 5 ACTIVE
trials; (3) rewards received by the computer player (in phases 3
and 4) during each of the previous 3WATCH trials; and (4) choices
made by the computer player (in phases 3 and 4) on each of the
previous 3 WATCH trials (Materials and Methods).
The results of an overall ANOVAwhich included factors com-
prising participant group, latency (i.e., trials into the past), and in-
formation type (i.e., directly experienced and observed choices
and reward outcomes) are summarized in Supplementary
Table 6. There was a signiﬁcant effect of group [Χ2(50) = 72.02,
P = 0.022], and to anticipate the results, this was driven by a spe-
ciﬁc deﬁcit in observational learning in the vmPFC group (see
below). We ﬁrst consider effects relating to experiential learning
—that is, the inﬂuence of participants’ own past choices and
reward outcomes on current behavior.
As expected, there was a signiﬁcant effect of participant
rewards during ACTIVE trials [Χ2(15) = 1217.10, P < 0.0001: Fig. 4],
whose inﬂuence decayed with increasing time into the past
[latency × participant reward interaction: Χ2(12) = 25.76, P = 0.012].
Figure 4.Results of logistic regression: Inﬂuence of previously experiencedand observed rewards and choices on current behavior. (A) vmPFC andNCgroups and (B) vmPFC
and BDC groups. Experiential learning (“ACTIVE” trials: left-side panels): Top panels show inﬂuence of past rewards and bottom panels show inﬂuence of past participant
choices on current behavior. x-axis refers to the numberof trials in the past (e.g., Rewards: from the previous trial, t−1, until 5 trials in the past, t−5). Regression coefﬁcients,
for rewards (top panels) or choices (bottom panels), plotted on y-axis (solid line indicates the vmPFC group, and dashed line indicates the appropriate comparison group
group). For example, a reward coefﬁcient of 0.003 relating to the t−1 trial indicates that the receipt of +100 points for choosing fractal A on the previous trial would increase
the choice log odds of choosing fractal A on the current trial by 0.3 (i.e., 0.003 × 100). Similarly, a choiceweight of 0.6 relating to the t−1 trial indicates that choosing fractal A
on the previous trial would increase the log odds of selecting fractal A on the current trial by 0.6, above and beyond any reward received on the last trial (or, indeed, any
rewards or choices relating to the computer player). SeeMaterials andMethods for details. Observational learning (“WATCH” trials: right-side panels): Top panels show the
inﬂuence of past observed rewards and bottom panels show the inﬂuence of past observed choices on current behavior. x-axis refers to the number of trials in the past
(from the previous, t−1, trial until 3 trials in the past, t−3). Regression coefﬁcients, for rewards (upper) or choices (lower panels), plotted on y-axis (solid line indicates the
vmPFC group, and dashed line indicates the appropriate comparison group). For example, a reward coefﬁcient of 0.004 relating to the t−1 trial indicates that if the
“computer player” received a loss of −500 points for choosing fractal A on the previous WATCH trial, this would decrease the log odds of “the participant” choosing
fractal A on the current ACTIVE trial by 2 (i.e., 0.004 × 500). Similarly, a choice weight of 0.4 relating to the t−1 trial indicates that if the computer player had chosen
fractal A on the last WATCH trial, this would increase the log odds of the “participant” selecting fractal A on the current ACTIVE trial by 0.4, above and beyond any
reward received by the computer on the last WATCH trial (and, indeed, any rewards received by the participant, or choices made by the participant). See Materials and
Methods for details. Whiskers indicate BCa 95% conﬁdence intervals [CIs; see DiCiccio and Effron (1996)]: Right-angle endlines are associated with CIs for comparison
participants, and angled endlines with CIs for vmPFC participants. Note that overlapping BCa conﬁdence intervals do not indicate nonsigniﬁcant differences; a better
indicator of group differences is exclusion of the contrasting mean value from the interval. Symbols: *PBCa < 0:05;
∼PBCa < 0:10.
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There were no signiﬁcant interactions of these factors with the
group [Χ2(8) = 8.16, P = 0.418]. In NC participants, the inﬂuence
of rewards for trials t−1 (PBCa < 0:0001, where PBCa valueswere cal-
culated using the BCa method and nonparametric conﬁdence in-
tervals—see Materials and Methods), t−2 (PBCa < 0:0001), and t−3
(PBCa < 0:05) was signiﬁcant, whereas that at trial t−4wasmargin-
al (PBCa ¼ 0:11). The vmPFC patients also showed effects of recent
rewards on current choices at trials t−1 (PBCa < 0:0001), t−2
(PBCa < 0:05), and t−3 (PBCa < 0:05). While pairwise comparisons
suggested that the inﬂuence of rewards received at trial t−2 was
reduced in both the vmPFC and BDC groups relative to the NC
group (PBCa < 0:005and<0:05; respectively), these effects cannot
be considered reliable in the absence of a Group × Participant
Reward × Latency interaction in the overall ANOVA (see Supple-
mentary Table 6).
We also found a signiﬁcant effect of past participant choices
during ACTIVE trials on behavior [Χ2(15) = 1365.71, P < 0.0001],
with the inﬂuence of past choices decaying with increasing
latency [latency × participant choice interaction: Χ2(12) = 378.60,
P < 0.0001]. No interaction of these factors with group was
found [Χ2(8) = 7.50, P = 0.484]. On any given trial, therefore, all par-
ticipant groups tended to repeat choices they had made in the
past—an effect that extended in NC participants until trial t−3
(each time point, PBCa < 0:001), and in vmPFC and BDC patients
to trial t−2 (PBCa < 0:005). Interestingly, this tendency to repeat
past choices independent of any rewards received (i.e., persever-
ate) was in fact most prominent in the NC group: The choice
made in trial t−3 exerted a signiﬁcantly greater inﬂuence on
the current choice in NC participants than in vmPFC patients
(PBCa < 0:05), with a marginally signiﬁcant effect observed when
the NC group was compared with the BDC group (PBCa ¼ 0:058).
Notably, however, the absence of a signiﬁcant Group × Choice ×
Latency effect in the overall ANOVA [Χ2(8) = 7.50, P = 0.484] sug-
gests caution in interpreting this perseverative tendency in NC
participants.
Results: No Evidence for a Failure of Contingent Learning in Patients
with vmPFC Damage
Ourﬁndings, therefore, suggest that our cohort of vmPFCpatients
retain a similar capacity as the BDC group in adapting their be-
havior based on the rewarding consequences of their own intern-
ally generated choices, with only equivocal evidence that this
differed from that of the NC group. We next considered whether
damage to the vmPFC might speciﬁcally impair “contingent
learning,”whereby discrete associations are formed between in-
dividual choices on a given ACTIVE trial and their speciﬁc out-
comes (Walton et al. 2010; Rushworth et al. 2011). Indeed,
recent work in monkeys suggests that the lateral OFC may play
an important role in maintaining a neural representation of
current choice and the outcome, facilitating their association
with one another (Walton et al. 2010). As such, damage to the lat-
eral OFC in non-human primates results in a phenomenon
known as a “spread of effect,” whereby reinforcement informa-
tion on a given trial is assigned backwards, or even forwards, in
time, therefore becoming associated with past or future actions
(Walton et al. 2010). Blurring of the speciﬁc choice–outcome
history in this way can lead to surprising consequences: for ex-
ample, the receipt of a large losswhen a given stimulus (e.g., frac-
tal A) was chosen on trial t−1 might aberrantly increase the
probability of reselecting this stimulus on the current trial (t), if
the same stimulus had been associatedwith a favorable outcome
on previous trials (e.g., the t−2 trial). In our next analysis, there-
fore, we asked whether our cohort of vmPFC patients might have
a speciﬁc deﬁcit in contingent learning. To carry out this
regression analysis, we included all possible combinations of as-
sociations between choices and outcomes pertaining to the last 3
trials in the regression model, following the procedure of Walton
et al. (2010). We found no evidence for a failure of contingent
learning in patients with vmPFC damage. Speciﬁcally, the inﬂu-
ence of speciﬁc choice–outcome associations (e.g., t−1 reward
with choice on t−1 trial) was greater than false associations
(e.g., reward received on trial t−1 with choice made on trial t−2)
in vmPFC patients, NC participants, and BDC patients (Fig. 5).
Logistic Regression Analyses: Observational Learning
We next examined the capacity of vmPFC patients, and the 2
comparison groups, to learn in an observational fashion, in
phases 3 and 4 where participants had the opportunity to beneﬁt
from viewing the choices and outcomes of a computer player on
alternate WATCH trials (see Materials and Methods). As stated
previously, participants were instructed that the computer’s
choices were entirely random, but also that they would be able
to learn through observation of the resultant outcomes. Partici-
pants’ current choices were signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the
observed outcomes relating to the computer player [Χ2(15) =
1082.78, P < 0.001]. There was a positive inﬂuence of past
computer rewards relating to the immediately preceding trial
(i.e., t−1) in all groups (reward weights: P < 0.0001 all groups),
which declined over time into the past [latency × computer re-
ward interaction: Χ2(12) = 236.73, P < 0.001]. However, there was
a speciﬁc deﬁcit in the vmPFC group in using previously observed
reward outcomes to guide their choice behavior, evidenced by
a signiﬁcant group × computer reward interaction [Χ2(10) = 42.34,
P < 0.0001; Fig. 4 and see Supplementary Table 6]. Pairwise com-
parisons revealed that both NC and BDC groups showed a sig-
niﬁcantly greater inﬂuence of t−1 rewards than vmPFC patients
(NC PBCa ¼ 0:033 and BDC PBCa ¼ 0:016). The inﬂuence of observed
rewards did not differ betweenNC and BDC groups (PBCa > 0:1). Of
note, there was also a signiﬁcant group × latency × computer
reward interaction [Χ2(8) = 41.05, P < 0.0001]: This was driven by
a tendency for theNC and BDC groups to select the less rewarding
of the 2 stimuli observed on WATCH trials occurring at t−2 and
t−3 trials in the past (see Fig. 4A and B, top right panels), in con-
trast to the vMPFC group where t−2 and t−3 trial outcomes
exerted no inﬂuence on current choice (i.e., regression coefﬁcient
= 0). While it is difﬁcult to provide a deﬁnitive interpretation of
this ﬁnding—which is qualitatively mirrored in the analysis of
observed choices (see Fig. 4A and B bottom right panels)—it is
consistent with the overall diminished inﬂuence of previously
observed outcomes on current choice in the vmPFC group, and
we speculate that this may reﬂect strategic biases in the NC
and BDC groups.
We also found that participants’ current choices on ACTIVE
trials were signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the past choices made
by the computer player during WATCH trials [Χ2(15) = 97.30,
P < 0.001]. As such, all groups had a tendency to follow the previ-
ous action of the computer player, even though this was known
to be random in nature, and therefore uninformative. This inﬂu-
ence also decreased over time into the past [latency × computer
choice interaction: Χ2(12) = 41.51, P < 0.001; see Supplementary
Table 6]. As such, the inﬂuence of observed choices also extended
only to the immediately preceding trial (i.e., t−1 choice weights,
NC group, PBCa < 0:001; vmPFC group PBCa ¼ 0:005; BDC group
PBCa ¼ 0:010; Fig. 4b). Interestingly, the tendency of the NC
group to repeat the computer player’s last action was signiﬁcant-
ly greater than that of the vmPFC group (PBCa ¼ 0:010), whose per-
formance was not distinguishable from that of the BDC group
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(PBCa > 0:2). However, this choice-related ﬁnding should be con-
sidered unreliable, given the absence of a signiﬁcant group ×
computer choice effect [Χ2(10) = 13.47, P = 0.1985].
Our ﬁndings provide evidence that the vmPFCmakes a specif-
ic contribution to the learning of values through the observation
of the reward outcomes that resulted from externally generated
actions (i.e., of a computer player) during WATCH trials. Given
previous work implicating the vmPFC in reversal learning (e.g.,
Fellows and Farah 2003), however, we next considered the possi-
bility that this deﬁcit in observational learning might reﬂect an
impairment in updating values after a reversal has occurred. To
consider this possibility, we restricted the logistic regression ana-
lysis to trials before the ﬁrst reversal had occurred, in each experi-
mental phase. Given the reduced quantity of data entered into
the model (approximately 1200 trials per participant group), we
adjusted the number of parameters to increase the robustness
of our model’s ﬁt, and so the inﬂuence of participant and com-
puter choices and rewards was restricted to t−3 trials in the past.
Importantly, a qualitatively similar pattern of ﬁndings was ob-
served to those reported for the full dataset. Speciﬁcally, we
found a selective deﬁcit in the ability of vmPFC patients to use ob-
served rewards to guide their decision-making behavior [three-
way interaction of group by latency by computer reward, Χ2(4) =
18.63, P < 0.001]. This result, therefore, conﬁrms that patients
withvmPFCdamage showa reduced inﬂuence of observational re-
wards on current behavior during initial learning relative to the
comparison groups, even prior to the occurrence of any reversals.
As a supplemental analysis, we also included the cumulative
point totals that were presented every ﬁfth trial to participants
(see Materials and Methods) as an additional variable in the re-
gression analysis relating to phase 4. A qualitatively similar pat-
tern of ﬁndings was observed as in the primary analysis reported
above, with no signiﬁcant effect of cumulative totals on choice
behavior (P > 0.1).
We also considered the possibility that patients with vmPFC
damage may be impaired at observational learning because it is
simply more difﬁcult than experiential learning in our paradigm.
To address this issue, we examined the response time (RT) data
obtained during ACTIVE trials: We found that the RT of vmPFC
patients was numerically [but not statistically; each T(12) < 0.5,
each P > 0.6] faster in the experimental phases that involved ob-
servational learning (i.e., phases 3 and 4), when compared with
phase 2 which involved purely experiential learning (see Supple-
mentary Fig. 4). Importantly, there was no signiﬁcant group ×
phase interaction in terms of RT (F4,60 = 0.083, P = 0.987), arguing
against the notion that there was an increase in task difﬁculty
for the vmPFC group in experimental phases involving observa-
tional learning (also see Discussion for further consideration of
this point).
We also considered the possibility that the impairment in
observational learning exhibited by vmPFC patients might be
accounted for through a difference in general motivation—
speciﬁcally, that their apparent deﬁcitmight be driven selectively
by their performance in phase 4 (i.e., pure observational phase:
see Materials and Methods) due to a total absence of directly ex-
perienced rewardswhich led them to be insufﬁcientlymotivated.
Arguing strongly against this possibility, we found that patients
with vmPFC damage showed a deﬁcit in observational learning
even when the logistic regression analysis was restricted solely
to trials from phase 3 (PBCa < 0:001), where directly experienced
rewards occurred on alternate trials. Moreover, the same pattern
was also observed in an analysis using only data from phase 4
(PBCa < 0:001).
Results: Performance of a Patient with Damage to Bilateral
Dorsolateral PFC on the Probabilistic Task
In summary, our results point to a speciﬁc deﬁcit in observational
learning in patients with damage to the vmPFC. In contrast, our
results do not provide strong support for the role of the vmPFC
in experiential learning, at least in the context of the relatively
simple probabilistic scenarios examined (see Discussion). One
question that arises is whether this dissociation between experi-
ential and observational learning is speciﬁc to the vmPFC or also
applies to other PFC regions. While a single neuropsychological
Figure 5. Results of logistic regression analysis designed to assess contingent learning. Contingent learning refers to the formation of discrete associations between an
individual choice (e.g., on the last, n−1, trial) and its speciﬁc outcome (i.e., on the n−1 trial), as opposed to false associations between different trials (e.g., n−2) and other
outcomes (e.g., n−3 trial). The matrices (left: NC, center: BDC, and right: vmPFC group) show the magnitude of regression coefﬁcients (white = large and black = small)
relating to the association of each of the 3 past reward outcomes with each of the past 3 choices. Squares on the diagonal, therefore, relate to contingent learning:
that is, veridical associations between a speciﬁc trial (e.g., n−1) and the speciﬁc outcome received (at n−1 trial). Off-diagonal components index the strength of false
associations: for example, the bottom left square relates to the association of the reward received on the last trial (n−1) with the choice made on the n−3 trial.
As such, a high magnitude coefﬁcient indexed by this component would indicate that if fractal A had been chosen 3 trials in the past, then receiving a large reward
on the last trial would increase the log odds of selecting fractal A on the next trial, irrespective of which fractal was chosen on the n−1 trial and what reward was
received on the n−3 trial. See the main text for details.
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study by nature is not able to localize a single cognitive function
(e.g., observational learning) to a unique brain region (e.g., vmPFC),
we sought additional neuroanatomical constraint by assessing the
effects of damage to the dorsal PFC [i.e., sparing vmPFC: see Supple-
mentary Fig. 3 and Table 2 (legend) on performance in our task].
Since lesions affecting the dorsal PFC bilaterally are rare, we
examined the single case extant to our knowledge in the Iowa
Registry (see Materials and Methods). Due to the dPFC patient’s
unique status in our study, the direct statistical comparisons
used elsewhere to test the performance of other groups against
one another were not possible. Instead, we provide speciﬁc details
about his performance in each condition of each task accompan-
ied where possible by statistical comparisons using the modiﬁed
Crawford’s t-test [i.e., designed for use in comparing single cases
with groups: seeMaterials andMethods (Crawford andGarthwaite
2002)]. The difference in performance between the dPFC case and
other groups (i.e., vmPFC, NC, BDC) groups was striking (see Sup-
plementary Tables 5 and 7). In terms of coarse aggregatemeasures
(see Supplementary Table 5), the dPFC case failed to reverse in any
session, scored below chance performance in all sessions but one
(session 3), and showed no sensitivity to largemagnitude gains or
losses (i.e., indexed by % switching tendency: see Supplementary
Table 5). Theperformanceof thedPFCcasewas signiﬁcantlyworse
than that of the other patient groups in nearly all sessions (i.e.,
usingmodiﬁedCrawford’s t-test; seeMethods and Supplementary
Table 7 for details).
Logistic regression analysis was also applied to the dPFC pa-
tient’s choice and reward history as described above, although
it should be noted that given this is a single case relatively few
trials were available. Therefore, the ﬁtted parameter values
should be interpreted with caution as a result. This analysis sug-
gested that the patientwas largely insensitive to the history of re-
wards or choices, whether his own or that of the computer player
(see Supplementary Fig. 5; red dots indicate dPFC patient param-
eter estimates). This contrasts sharply with the performance of
the other groups, who typically showed signiﬁcant evidence of
sensitivity to reward and choice history even, for example, dam-
age to vmPFC was related to reductions in the size of the param-
eter estimates relating to observational learning.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that value sig-
nals are distributed across prefrontal regions (Kennerley et al.
2009; Rushworth et al. 2011). While we are cautious about draw-
ing conclusions from a single case study, these results suggest
that the dPFCmay play a role in feedback-driven learning regard-
less of whether the feedback is experienced or observed, at least
in the context of the experimental setting examined. In relation
to this, it is worth bearing inmind that in our paradigm, themag-
nitude of rewards was informative (cf. other settings where re-
ward magnitude is ﬁxed at +1 or −1, and only the probability
varies across stimuli: also see Discussion)—an aspect of the
task thatmay interact with the impairment in executive function
(i.e., Wisconsin card sorting task—see Supplementary Table 2)
shown by the dPFC case. Regardless, the results from the analysis
of this dPFC case support the speciﬁc contribution of the vmPFC
to observational learning, over and above its contribution to ex-
periential learning.
Results: Overall Performance on Deterministic Task
Given that these results were obtained in the context of a prob-
abilistic reward environment, for completeness we also assessed
the experiential learning performance of our cohort of vmPFC pa-
tients in a deterministic setting. This was motivated by a previ-
ous report which found that a separate cohort of patients with
damage to the vMPFC shows marked impairments in such a
setting (Fellows and Farah 2003). Supplementary Table 8 and Fig-
ure 6 illustrate the performance of vmPFC and both comparison
groups under these conditions, according to a number of basic
measures such as total points won and number of reversals
achieved. While no signiﬁcant group differencewas observed be-
tween vmPFC patients and comparisons on either of these mea-
sures (each F2,30 < 2.4, each P > 0.1), the exceptional nature of the
performance of 2 vmPFC patients was noteworthy. The total
number of pointswon by these patients (200 and−100 by patients
8 and 3, respectively) fell more than 6 SD below the mean per-
formance of BDCs (mean = 2082, SD = 282), more than 5 SD
below the mean performance of NCs (mean = 2000, SD = 352),
and more than 4 standard deviations below the mean of the re-
maining vmPFC patients (mean = 2106, SD = 397, see Supplemen-
tary Fig. 6). Additionally, these 2 patients completed only 1
reversal each, falling more than 7 SD below the average perform-
ance of the other vmPFC patients (mean = 4.7 reversals, SD = 0.5),
more than 5 SD below the performance of BDCs on this measure
(mean 4.3, SD = 0.8), and more than 4 SD below the performance
of NCs (mean = 4.6, SD = 0.8).
In contrast to the ﬁndings of Fellows and Farah (2003), a sub-
stantial majority (i.e., 9/11) of the patients in our cohort per-
formed equivalently to NC and BDC participants on the
deterministic version of the reversal task. Despite the low vari-
ance in the independence on activities of daily living (IADL)
scores of our vmPFC group, we also observed a signiﬁcant correl-
ation between this measure and performance of patients on the
reversal task as indexed by total pointswon and number of rever-
sals achieved (both r > 0.6, P < 0.05). Note, however, that this cor-
relation was driven primarily by the marginally low (i.e., 20/21)
IADLs of the 2 patients mentioned above who performed very
poorly on the reversal task. As reported previously for the prob-
abilistic scenario, no signiﬁcant correlations were found (P > 0.1)
between performance (i.e., either in terms of points won or num-
ber of reversals) of individual vmPFC patients and the extent of
damage to the lateral orbital gyrus, as measured using volumet-
ric analyses (see Materials and Methods).
Notably, the dPFC case performed poorly in this setting also,
failing to complete any reversals. Even in this task, the dPFC pa-
tient scored only 300 points (see Supplementary Table 8), a per-
formance matched by only the very poorly performing 2 vmPFC
patients (see above).
Discussion
Our neuropsychological study investigated the contribution of
the vmPFC to experiential and observational learning—a distinc-
tion operationalized here as the ability to update stimulus values
based on the rewarding outcomes that follow either internally
generated (i.e., experiential) or externally generated (i.e., obser-
vational) actions. Fine-grained analysis of experiential choice be-
havior revealed that the current behavior of vmPFC patients was
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by past rewards and choices in amanner
thatwas equivalent to a BDC group, and onlymarginally different
from the NC group. Despite this relatively intact capacity for ex-
periential learning, patients with vmPFC damage exhibited a sig-
niﬁcant deﬁcit in observational learning, manifest in the reduced
inﬂuence of previously observed rewards on current choices. Our
ﬁndings provide causal evidence that the vmPFC is necessary for
normal learning of stimulus values from observed rewards, and
point toward the conclusion that there are dissociable neural cir-
cuits for experiential and observational learning.
It is interesting to consider our ﬁndings in relation to a previ-
ous neuroimaging study by Walton et al. (2004), which used an
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experimental design that has conceptual similarities with our
own (Walton et al. 2004). In their experiment, participants were
required to adjust their behavior by monitoring outcomes
under 2 different conditions: One in which participants had free-
ly chosen the action themselves and the other in which the ac-
tion to be performed was instructed by an external cue
speciﬁed by the experimenter. They reported a dissociation be-
tween the medial and lateral OFC and the dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC): Neural activity in the OFC was greatest when
participants were required tomonitor the consequences of exter-
nally cued actions, whereas that in the ACC was highest in rela-
tion to the outcome of voluntarily chosen actions. Though the
exact task performed by participants in the study by Walton
et al. differs from our paradigm—and while neural activity in
theOFCwas localized primarily to the lateral (rather thanmedial)
portion in their study—these previous results are broadly con-
sistent with our ﬁnding that the integrity of the vmPFC is particu-
larly important when stimulus values must be updated based on
the observation of the consequences of externally (vs. internally)
generated actions.
Though our study focused explicitly on a core component of
observational learning (i.e., learning from the outcomes of exter-
nally generated actions) within a nonsocial domain, it is worth
relating our ﬁndings to recent fMRI studies that have sought to re-
veal the neural signatures of observational learning within the
social domain (Burke et al. 2010; Cooper et al. 2012; Liljeholm
et al. 2012), and one study in particular that employed a closely
related experimental design (Burke et al. 2010). As in phase 3 of
our experiment, participants in the study by Burke et al. showed
evidence of learning both from the outcomes of their own
choices, but also those of another agent—in this case, a human
confederatewhowas unknown to them. In addition, participants
could also proﬁt from the observed choices of the confederate
agent (e.g., through imitation)—a source of information that
was intentionally absent in our paradigm (i.e., the choices of
the computer player were random), to allow us to focus squarely
on learning from observed outcomes. Activity in the vmPFC in
the study by Burke et al., at the time when the outcome of the
confederate’s choice was revealed, was found to reﬂect a signed
prediction error signal [i.e., the difference between expected
and observed outcome; also see Suzuki et al. (2012)]. Interesting-
ly, the pattern of neural activity in the vmPFC was qualitatively
different from that in the dorsolateral PFC, where activity at
time of confederate choice tracked the difference between actual
and expected action (i.e., an action prediction error).
By demonstrating that damage to the vmPFC impairs the abil-
ity to learn from observed rewarding outcomes, our ﬁndings are
consistent with the hypothesis that the outcome prediction error
signals observed by Burke et al. causally drive learning. Whilewe
characterized choice behavior using a logit model (e.g., to avoid
the assumption of an exponential decay in the inﬂuence of
past outcomes over time—see Materials and Methods) rather
than a reinforcement learning model, our demonstration that
vmPFC patients are less inﬂuenced by observational outcomes
is entirely consistent with an impairment in an error-correcting
learning process. Our ﬁndings, together with those of Burke
et al. (2010), raise the possibility that the vmPFC forms part of
the neural circuitry that supports observational learning, per-
haps irrespective of whether the agent under observation is in-
herently social or not, a hypothesis that merits direct testing in
future studies involving patients with vmPFC damage. Import-
antly, we believe that any vmPFC contribution to observational
learning is distinct from Pavlovian learning (and the related no-
tion of Pavlovian-instrumental transfer) where outcomes are
directly experienced by the participant, andwhichhas previously
been associated with ventral striatum [e.g., see Dickinson and
Balleine (2002), O’Doherty et al. (2004), Talmi et al. (2008)]—al-
though we cannot rule out the possibility that participants im-
agine receiving rewards given to the computer participant,
enabling a form of Pavlovian learning.
The focus of our study was the role of the vmPFC in observa-
tional learning, but we also established that all participants per-
formed similarly when learning experientially. Notably, our
ﬁnding of unimpaired experiential learning might appear sur-
prising given the critical role ascribed to the vmPFC in value-
guided decision-making (e.g., Rushworth et al. 2011; Levy and
Glimcher 2012). A critical factor may be that, in our task, partici-
pants were required to choose between 2 stimuli whose magni-
tude varied probabilistically (cf. Daw et al. 2006) and whose
reward schedules were markedly separated. As such at our prob-
abilistic task differs in an important respect from other settings
where reward magnitude is ﬁxed at +1 or −1, and only the prob-
ability varies across stimuli (e.g., Noonan et al. 2010). Unlike these
other probabilistic scenarios (e.g., reviewed in Rushworth et al.
2011), in our task it is not critical to integrate reward outcome in-
formation over long timewindows. Instead, a simple strategy in-
volving switching after a large losswould be relatively effective in
our task—indeed, we observed similar rates of response switch-
ing after signiﬁcant losses in all groups. This accountmayalso ac-
count for previous ﬁndings that lesions of the vmPFC can impair
experiential learning, in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara
et al. 1994; Gläscher et al. 2012). Speciﬁcally, our paradigm and
the IGT differ considerably in terms of their complexity. In the
IGT participants must choose between 4 options with differing
reward schedules, rendering a “lose-shift” strategy a relatively in-
effective solution (though one notably employed by both vmPFC
patients and comparison participants at similar rates; Bechara
et al. 1994). Taken together, therefore, our ﬁndings and those
from previous reports of IGT impairment after vmPFC damage
suggest that the complexity of the environment (i.e., number of
options and reward schedules) is a critical determinant of
whether damage to the vmPFC produces an impairment in deci-
sion-making based on experiential learning. Intriguingly, this hy-
pothesis receives support from recent work in humans which
suggests that the vmPFC is only engaged when choices are sufﬁ-
ciently difﬁcult (Hunt et al. 2013), and in non-human primates
(Noonan et al. 2010) which demonstrates that damage to the
mOFC/vmPFC only produces a signiﬁcant performance deﬁcit
in a three-armed bandit task when reward schedules are closely
aligned.
Along these lines, it is also worth considering whether our
ﬁnding that observational learning was speciﬁcally affected by
damage to the vmPFC could have arisen because it is more difﬁ-
cult than experiential learning (i.e., in the experiential tasks
tested)—or as a result of attentional deﬁcits in the vmPFC
group. While we cannot deﬁnitely rule out such an account, we
would argue that the overall pattern of ﬁndings [i.e., number of
points won, RT and neuropsychological scores] does not provide
support either of these accounts. First, NC and BDC participants
acquired a comparable number of points over the course of ex-
perimental phases whether the task required pure experiential
learning (phase 2) or pure observational learning (phase 4). Sec-
ondly, the RT of vmPFC patients was not slower in the experi-
mental phases that involved observational learning (i.e., phases
3 and 4) compared with phases involved purely experiential
learning (see Results and Supplementary Fig. 1), suggesting that
all scenarios were similarly challenging. Furthermore, there was
no signiﬁcant group × phase interaction in terms of RT (see
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Results), arguing against the notion that there was an increase in
task difﬁculty for the vmPFC group in experimental phases in-
volving observational learning. Thirdly, the choices of the
vmPFC group were inﬂuenced not only by the outcomes received
but also the choices made by the computer player—refuting the
possibility that vmPFC patients paid little attention during
WATCH trials. Finally, neuropsychological test scores did not in-
dicate that either group had general deﬁcits in concentration or
attention with no signiﬁcant differences observed between BDC
and vMPFC on relevant measures [i.e., complex ﬁgure copy, wis-
consin card sorting test, trails B–A, and working memory index
(WMI): all P > 0.1 exceptWMIwhere therewas a trend for superior
performance in the vmPFC group (P = 0.07)].
Our tasks incorporated a reversal component, and vmPFC pa-
tients performed the experiential phases of the task similarly to
comparison participants in terms of overall measures (e.g., total
points won and number of reversals). This contrasts with previ-
ous neuropsychological studies demonstrating a signiﬁcant re-
versal deﬁcit in closely related deterministic (Rolls et al. 1994;
Fellows and Farah 2003) and probabilistic tasks (Hornak et al.
2004) that relied on experiential learning. For instance, a study
by Fellows and Farah (2003) showed that patients classiﬁed as
having primary damage to the vmPFCmademore reversal errors
than comparison participants in the context of a deterministic
task where one response yielded a $50 win and the other a $50
loss. Notably, vmPFC patients in that study were signiﬁcantly
more disabled, as indexed by lower scores on a standardmeasure
assessing IADL (mean = 17.8, SD = 3.4), than those in our cohort
(mean = 20.6, SD = 0.5; nb: A maximum IADL score is 21). As
such, one factor thatmay account for the performance difference
between our cohort of vmPFC patients and those in previous
reports is that the severity of damage andanatomical locus varies
considerably between individual patients and groups. While
these earlier reversal learning studies have typically not
performed a quantitative analysis of lesion extent [Rolls et al.
1994; Fellows and Farah 2003; Hornak et al. 2004; although see
Tsuchida et al. (2010)], patients characterized as having vmPFC
lesions sometimes have damage extending into the lateral OFC,
a region thatwas relatively spared in our cohort. Although it is be-
yond the scope of the current study, future research should dir-
ectly contrast the roles of human vmPFC/mOFC and lateral OFC
to determine whether these regions make unique contributions
to experiential and observational learning.
One potential account of the ﬁnding of preserved experiential
learning in vmPFC patients is that our study was not sufﬁciently
powered to observe a signiﬁcant impairment in experiential
learning. We suggest, however, that this scenario is unlikely for
2 reasons. First, our dataset included 3000 trials per participant
group (cf. 500–800 in other studies, e.g., Fellows and Farah 2003)
as a result of testing a relatively large sample of vmPFC patients
in a range of decision-making scenarios. Based on themagnitude
of the deﬁcit observed in previous studies [e.g., around 4000
points in the probabilistic scenario of Hornak et al. (2004)], our
study would have been ideally powered to detect any impair-
ment. Secondly, we provide “positive” evidence that patients
with vmPFC damage are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by their past re-
wards and choices when learning experientially.
In summary, our ﬁndings demonstrate a speciﬁc deﬁcit in ob-
servational learning—operationalized here as the ability to learn
stimulus values from the rewarding outcomes of externally gen-
erated actions—among patients with vmPFC damage. As argued
above, our data provide evidence that this ﬁnding that is not eas-
ily explained by task difﬁculty or attentional differences between
the experiential tasks used. To be clear, however, we fully concur
with previous lines of work, suggesting that the vmPFC is likely
critical to experiential learning in settings whose complexity or
probabilistic nature (i.e., where magnitude is ﬁxed, and probabil-
ity of gain/loss varies across stimuli) differs those examined
in this study [e.g., Noonan et al. 2010; Hunt et al. 2013; also see
Suzuki et al. (2012)].
Interestingly, such a role for the vmPFC in updating reward re-
presentations of stimuli based on passive observation of the en-
vironment accords well with the previous work, suggesting that
the vmPFC automatically computes a value (Lebreton et al.
2009) through integrating different sources of information (e.g.,
Smith et al. 2010; Levy and Glimcher 2012), drawing on its rich
connectivity and functional interactions with sensory areas of
the neocortex (Carmichael and Price 1996; Noonan et al. 2011,
2012). This contrasts with regions such as the ACC which are
often believed to sustain reward representations that are more
tightly coupled to speciﬁc actions mediated through more direct
projections to motor areas (e.g., premotor area; Kennerley et al.
2006; Rushworth et al. 2007; Hayden and Platt 2010; Kennerley
and Walton 2011; Hunt et al. 2013). While the vmPFC, therefore,
appears to be necessary for observational learning, one caveat
to this conclusion is that lesions that encompass this brain struc-
ture may also inadvertently damage ﬁbers of passage which
themselves might produce behavioral impairments [e.g., see
Rudebeck and Murray (2011b)]. Furthermore, prior evidence
suggests that other brain regions also contribute to observational
learning, notably the hippocampus (Poldrack et al. 2001; Shohamy
et al. 2004, 2008), a structurewhich is also thought to interact func-
tionally with the vmPFC during goal-directed decision-making
(Kumaran et al. 2009, 2012; Roy et al. 2012). Indeed, the “episodic”
nature (i.e., extending only to t−1 trial) of the inﬂuence of observed
rewards on current behavior accordswith such a notion, and high-
lights the potential involvement of the vmPFC in episodic control
(Lengyel and Dayan 2007). It is tempting to speculate, therefore,
that the vmPFCmay support observational learning through func-
tional interactions with the hippocampus, an intriguing hypoth-
esis that deserves investigation in future studies—perhaps
drawing on recent advances in using multivariate techniques in
lesion studies to identify the joint contribution of multiple brain
areas to behavior (Smith et al. 2010).
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